In marketing products with negative externalities, a schedule which specifies an order of consumer purchase decisions is crucial, since in the social network of consumers, the decision of each consumer is negatively affected by the choices of her neighbors. In this paper, we study the problems of finding a marketing schedule for two asymmetric products with negative externalites. The goals are two-fold: maximizing the sale of one product and ensuring regret-free purchase decisions. We show that the maximization is NP-hard, and provide efficient algorithms with satisfactory performance guarantees. Two of these algorithms give regret-proof schedules, i.e. they reach Nash equilibria where no consumers regret their previous decisions. Our work is the first attempt to address these marketing problems from an algorithmic point of view.
Introduction
The total value of any (consumer) product can be roughly classified into three parts: physical value, emotional value, and social value [11] . With the fast development of economy, the basic physical needs of more and more consumers are easily met. Consequently, people increasingly shift their attention to emotional and social values when they consider whether to buy a product. In particular, the social value, whose amount is not determined by what a consumer consumes alone or how she personally enjoys it, but by the comparisons with what other people around her consume, is becoming a more and more crucial ingredient for both consumer purchase and therefore seller marketing. For many products, whether they will be welcome depends mainly on how much social value they can provide to the consumers. This is especially true for fashionable and luxury goods, where the products often exhibit negative (consumption) externalities -they become less valuable as more people use them [1, 9] .
The comparison that a consumer makes, for calculating the social value of a product, is naturally restricted to her neighbors in the social network. For a consumer, the social value of a product with negative externality is often proportional to the number of her neighbors who do not consume this product [9] . In the market, the purchase decisions of a consumer often depend on the values of the products at the time they are promoted -the product of larger value will be selected. In contrast to the physical and emotional values, which are relatively fixed, the social values of products vary with different marketing schedules. The goal of this paper is to design good marketing schedules for promoting products with negative externalities in social networks.
Motivation and related work Our study is motivated by the practical marketing problem concerning how to bring the products to consumers' attention over time. Among a large literature on diffusion of competing products or opinions in social networks (see e.g., [2, 7, 8] and references therein), Chierichetti, Kleinberg and Pancones [7] recently studied the scheduling aspect of the diffusion problem on two products -finding an order of consumer purchase decision making to maximize the adoption of one product. In their model, the two competing products both have positive (consumption) externalities and every consumer follows the majority of her social network neighbors when the externalities outweigh her own internal preference. The authors [7] provided an algorithm that ensures an expected linear number of favorable decisions.
The network-related consumption externalities have been classified into four categories [6] . Comparing to the other three, the negative cross-consumer externality, as considered in this paper, has been far less studied [1, 9] , and was emphasized for its importance in management and marketing nowdays [6] .
The model studied in this paper can also be taken as an extension of one side of the fashion game, which was formulated by Jackson [10] . Very interestingly, people often have quite different, in fact almost opposite, opinions on what is fashionable, e.g., "Lady Gaga is Godness of fashion" vs "This year's fashion color is black". Following Jackson, we call consumers holding the former "personality reflection" idea of fashion rebels and the latter "prevailing style" idea conformists. More generally, a consumer behaves like a rebel (conformist) if the product, from her point of view, has negative (positive) externality. In an era emphasizing personal identities, more and more consumers would like to be rebels. For example, they would prefer Asian-style pants, when seeing many friends and colleagues (their social network neighbors) wearing European-style. However, the rebel social network is still under-researched in comparison with vast literature on conformist social networks. For a market where all the consumers are rebels, as considered in this paper, it has been previously studied by several papers under the term of anti-coordination [4, 5] .
Model formulation The market is represented by a social network G = (V, E), an undirected graph with node set V consisting of n consumers and link set E of m connections between consumers. A seller has two (types of) products Y and N with similar functions. We abuse notations by using Y and N to denote both types and products.
The marketing is done sequentially: The seller is able to ask the consumers one by one whether they are more interested in Y or in N . Each consumer buys (chooses) exactly one of Y and N , whichever provides her a larger total value, only at the time she is asked. This is a simplification of the so called precision marketing [13] . For every consumer, a product of type T ∈ {Y, N } provides her with total value p T + s T (x T ), where p T is the sum of physical and emotional values, and s T (x T ) is the social value determined by decreasing function s T (·) and the number x T of her neighbors who have bought product T . We assume that Y is very similar to N with p Y > p N and the externality outweighs the physical and emotional difference, i.e., for any permutation T , F of Y, N and any nonnegative integers x, y (x < y) we have
Actually, the above model can be summarized as the following scheduling problems on rebel social networks.
Rebels. Every consumer is a rebel who, at her turn to choose from {Y, N }, will buy the product different from the one currently possessed by the majority of her neighbors. If there are equal numbers of neighbors having bought Y and N respectively, the consumer will always buy Y.
Scheduling. A (marketing) schedule π, for network G is an ordering of consumers in V which specifies the order π(v) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} of consumer v ∈ V being asked to buy (choose) Y or N , or "being scheduled" for short. We refer to the problem of finding a schedule for a rebel social network as the rebel scheduling problem. Given schedule π, the choice (purchase decision) of each consumer v under π is uniquely determined, and we denote it by π [v] , which belongs to {Y, N }. The decisions of all consumers form the marketing outcome (π [v] : v ∈ V ) of π. The basic goal of the rebel scheduling problem is to find a schedule whose outcome contains Y (resp. N ) decisions as many as possible because Y (resp. N ) is more profitable for the seller.
Equilibrium. As seen above, the value of a product changes as the marketing proceeds. Every schedule corresponds to a dynamic game among consumers. We assume that consumers behave naively without predictions. A natural question is: Can these simple behaviors (or equivalently, a schedule) eventually lead to a Nash equilibrium -a state where no consumer regrets her previous decision? This question is of both theoretical and practical interests. Schedules that lead to Nash equilibria are called regret-proof; they guarantee high consumer satisfaction, which is beneficial to the seller's future marketing.
Results and contribution We prove that it is NP-hard to find a marketing schedule that maximizes the number of Y (resp. N ) decisions. Complementary to the NP-hardness, we design O(n 2 )-time algorithms for finding schedules that guarantee at least n/2 decisions of Y, and at least n/3 decisions of N , respectively. The numbers n/2 and n/3 are best possible for any algorithm. Let α denote the size of maximum independent set of G. We show that regret-proof schedules that guarantee at least n/2 decisions of Y and at least max{ √ n + 1 − 1, (n − α)/2} decisions of N , respectively, can be found in time O(mn 2 ). In contrast, decentralized consumer choices without a schedule might result in an arbitrarily worse outcome. This can be seen from the star network, where in the worst case only one consumer chooses the product consistent with the seller's objective.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to address the scheduling problems for marketing products with negative externalities (i.e marketing in rebel social networks). Our algorithms for maximizing the number of Y decisions can be extended to deal with the case of promoting one product where Y and N are interpreted as buying and not buying, respectively.
Maximization
We study the rebel scheduling problem to maximize seller's profits in Subsections 2.1 and 2.2, respectively, for the cases of Y and N having higher net profits.
Throughout we consider G = (V, E) a connected rebel social network for which we have n = O(m). All results can be extended to any network without isolated nodes. Let π be a schedule for G, and u, v ∈ V . We say that π schedules v ∈ V with decision π[v] ∈ {Y, N }, and π schedules u before v if π(u) < π(v).
When Y is more profitable
It is desirable to find an optimal schedule that maximizes the number of consumers purchasing Y. Although this turns out to be a very hard task (Theorem 2.1), we can guarantee that at least half of the consumers choose Y (Theorem 2.2). Proof. We prove by reduction from the maximum independent set problem. Given any instance of the maximum independent set problem on connected graph H = (N, F ), by adding some pendant nodes to H we construct in polynomial time a network G (an instance of the rebel scheduling problem): For each node u ∈ N with degree d(u) in H, we add a set P u of d(u) nodes, and connect each of them to u. The resulting network G = (V, E) is specified by V := N ∪ (∪ u∈N P u ) and E := F ∪ (∪ u∈N {up : p ∈ P u }), where each node in V \ N = ∪ u∈N P u is pendant, and each node u ∈ N is non-pendant and has exactly 2d(u) neighbors: half of them are non-pendant nodes in N and the other half are the d(u) pendant nodes in P u .
We associate every schedule π for G with an integer θ(π), equal to the number of pendant nodes which are scheduled (by π) after their unique neighbors. Clearly
Claim 1. For any u ∈ N and any schedule π of G, if π schedules all nodes in P u ∪ {u} with Y, then (all the d(u) pendant neighbors of u in P u have to be scheduled before u with decisions Y, therefore) all the d(u) non-pendant neighbors of u have to be scheduled with N before u is scheduled. Consider π being an optimal schedule for G. If θ(π) = 0, then π schedules all pendant nodes before their neighbors, and hence all of these pendant nodes choose Y. It follows from Claim 1 that {v ∈ N : π[v] = Y} is an independent set of H. Since π is optimal, the independence set is maximum in H. Thus, in view of (2.1), to prove the theorem, it suffices to show the following. Claim 2. Given an optimal schedule π for G with θ(π) > 0, another optimal schedule π ′ for G with θ(π ′ ) < θ(π) can be found in polynomial time.
Since θ(π) > 0, we can take w ∈ N to be the last non-pendant node scheduled by π earlier than some of its pendant neighbors. Under π, let P ′ w (∅ = P ′ w ⊆ P w ) be the set of all pendant neighbors of w that are scheduled after w, let U be the set of non-pendant nodes scheduled after w, and let P U be the set of the pendant nodes whose (non-pendant) neighbors belong to U (possibly U = ∅ = P U ). The choice of w implies that π schedules every node in P U before its neighbor. Without loss of generality we may assume that under π,
• (Pendant) nodes in P U are scheduled before all other nodes (with Y).
• (Pendant) nodes in P ′ w are scheduled immediately after w one by one.
• (Non-pendant) nodes in U are scheduled at last. If π schedules w with N , then at later time it schedules all pendant nodes in P ′ w with Y. Another optimal schedule π ′ (for G) with the same outcome as π can be constructed as follows: π ′ schedules nodes in P ′ w first, and then schedules other nodes of V in a relative order the same as π. Clearly, π ′ with θ(π ′ ) ≤ θ(π) − 1 is the desired schedule. It remains to consider the case where π schedules w with
w . Let π ′ be the schedule that first schedules nodes of V \ {w} in a relative order the same as π, and schedules w finally. It is clear that
We only need to show that π ′ is optimal. Observe that π ′ first schedules every v ∈ V satisfying π(v) < π(w) with the same decision as in π (particularly, all nodes in P U are scheduled with Y). Subsequently, π ′ schedules nodes in P Suppose it were not the case. Let u ∈ U ⊆ N be the earliest node in U scheduled by π ′ with a decision
. It must be the case that w is a non-pendant neighbor of u and π[w] = π [u] . At the time π ′ schedules u, all pendant neighbors of u in P u ⊆ P U have been scheduled with Y and the non-pendant neighbor w has not been scheduled, it follows from Claim 1 that π
The optimality of π ′ is established, which proves Claim 2 and therefore Theorem 2.1.
We next design an algorithm for finding a schedule that ensures at least n/2 decisions of Y. The algorithm iteratively constructs a node set A for which there exist two schedules π ′ and π ′′ scheduling each node in A with different decisions. In the end, at least half nodes of A can be scheduled by either π ′ or π ′′ with Y decisions. Subsequently, the nodes outside A, which form an independent set, will all choose Y (in an arbitrary order).
Go back to Step 2.
6. Let π be π ′ or π ′′ whichever schedules more nodes with Y (break tie arbitrarily)
For convenience, we reserve symbol "schedule" for the scheduling (constructing π and π ′′ ) as conducted at Steps 3 and 5 in Algorithm 1. Similarly, we also say "schedule a node" and "schedule an edge" with the implicit understanding that the node and the edge satisfy the conditions in Step 2 and Step 5 of Algorithm 1.
Proof. The algorithm enlarges A gradually at Steps 3 and 5, producing a sequence of node sets A 0 = ∅,
The base case of k = 0 is trivial.
Suppose that k ≥ 1 and the statement is true for A k−1 . In case of A k being produced at Step 2, suppose w has n 1 (resp. n 2 ) neighbors in 
In either case, the statement is true for A k , proving the claim. 
Step 1 is to find a node w / ∈ A with δ w = 0 by visiting δ v , v ∈ V \ A.
Step 5 is to find a node u ∈ V \ A with δ ′ u ≥ 1 and then find a neighbor u ∈ V \ A of v. The search in both Steps 2 and 5 takes O(n) time. Each time Algorithm 1 adds a node v to A, the algorithm updates the entries of v's neighbors in the array, which takes O(n) time. Since we can add at most n nodes to A, Algorithm 1 terminates in O(n 2 ) time.
The tightness of n/2 in the above theorem can be seen from the case where the network G is a complete graph. Moreover, the theorem implies that Algorithm 1 is a 2-approximation algorithm for the rebel scheduling problem for maximizing Y decisions. Remark 2.3. It is worth noting that Algorithm 1 can be used to solve the scheduling problem when only one product is promoted, where a consumer buys the product only if at least a half of her neighbors do not have the product. Given a schedule π output by Algorithm 1, π specifies an order of consumers who choose Y. All these consumers will buy the product if the seller promotes the product to them according to this order.
When N is more profitable
In this subsection, the marketing scheduling is to maximize the number of N decisions. By reduction from the bounded occurrence MAX-2SAT problem (see Appendix A), we obtain the following NP-hardness.
Theorem 2.4. The rebel scheduling problem for maximizing the number of N decisions is NP-hard.
Next, we design a 3-approximation algorithm for finding in O(n 2 ) time a schedule which ensures at least n/3 decisions of N . This is accomplished by a refinement of Algorithm 1 with some preprocessing.
The following terminologies will be used in our discussion. Given a graph H with node set U , let R, S ⊆ U be two node subsets. We say that R dominates S if every node in S has at least a neighbor in R. We use H \ R to denote the graph obtained from H by deleting all nodes in R (as well as their incident links). Thus H \ R is the subgraph of H induced by U \ R, which we also denote as H[U \ R].
Preprocessing. Given a connected social network G = (V, E), let X be any maximal independent set of G. It is clear that
• X and Y := V \ X are disjoint node sets dominating each other.
We will partition X into X 1 , . . . , X ℓ and Y into Y 0 , Y 1 , . . . , Y ℓ for some positive integer ℓ such that Algorithm 1 schedules
•
• Set graph
, and we repeat the above process with
Inductively, for i = 1, 2, . . ., given graph
j=1 X j , and X i the set of all pendant nodes of G i contained in
• Let X i+1 ⊆ X \ ∪ i j=0 X j consist of all pendant nodes of G i+1 that are contained in X \ ∪ i j=0 X j . The procedure terminates at i = ℓ for which we have X \ ∪ ℓ j=0 X j = ∅, and Refinement. Next we show that Algorithm 1 can be implemented in a way that all nodes of subgraph G 1 are scheduled. If the implementation has led to at least n/3 decisions of N , we are done; otherwise, due to the maximality of the independent set X, we can easily find another schedule that makes at least n/3 nodes choose N . then schedule uv; A ← A ∪ {u, v}; Go back to Step 3.
The validity of Step 9 is guaranteed by Claim 3. Since X ∩ Y 0 = ∅, the following claim implies X ⊆ A.
Proof. We only need to show that each node
In case of w ∈ X k , it is pendant and has only one neighbor u in subgraph G k . If u ∈ A when w is checked at Step 3, then w is selected to A at Step 4; Otherwise, w and u will be selected to A at the same time in
Step 7.
In case of w ∈ Y k , by Claim 5, w is adjacent to a pendant node v ∈ X k of G
If |A| > 2n/3, then, by extending partial schedule π output by Algorithm 2, we obtain a schedule which makes at least n/3 nodes choose N . Otherwise, |V \ A| ≥ n/3, and all nodes in V \ A can be scheduled with N as follows: Schedule firstly the nodes in the maximal independent set X (all of them choose Y); secondly the nodes in V \ A, and finally all the other nodes. Recall that X dominates every node in Y ⊇ Y 0 . It follows from Claim 6 that X dominates V \ A. As V \ A is an independent set in G (by Claim 4(ii)), the decisions of all nodes in V \ A are N . We show in Appendix B that Algorithm 2 runs in square time, which implies the following. The tightness of n/3 can be seen from a number of disjoint triangles linked by a path, where each triangle has exactly two nodes of degree two.
Regret-proof schedules
We are to find regret-proof schedules, where every consumer, given the choices of other consumers in the outcome of the schedule, would prefer the product she bought to the other. Using link cuts as a tool, we design algorithms for finding regret-proof schedules that ensure at least n/2 decisions of Y and at least √ n + 1 − 1 decisions of N , respectively.
Stable cuts
Given G = (V, E), let R and S be two disjoint subsets of V . We use [R, S] to denote the set of links (in E) with one end in R and the other in S. If R ∪ S = V , we call [R, S] a link cut or simply a cut. For a node v ∈ V , we use d S (v) to denote the number of neighbors of v contained in S. Each schedule π for G is associated with a cut [S 1 , S 2 ] of G defined by its outcome: S 1 (resp. S 2 ) is the set of consumers scheduled with Y (resp. N ). A schedule π is regret-proof if and only if its associated cut [S 1 , S 2 ] is stable, i.e., satisfies the following conditions: A basic operation in our algorithms is "enlarging" unstable cuts by moving "violating" nodes from one side to the other. Let [S 1 , S 2 ] be an unstable cut of G for which some v ∈ S i (i = 1 or 2) is violating. We define type-i move of v (from S i to S 3−i ) to be the setting: S i ← S i \ {v}, S 3−i ← S 3−i ∪ {v}, which changes the cut. The violation of (3.1) implies (M1) type-1 move increases the cut size, and downsizes the leading set; (M2) type-2 move does not decrease the cut size, and enlarges the leading set.
Both types of moves are collectively called moves. Note that moves are only defined for violating nodes, and the cut size |[S 1 , S 2 ]| is nondecreasing under moves. To find a stable cut, our algorithms work with a cut [S 1 , S 2 ] of G and change it by moves sequentially. By (M1) and (M2), the number m 1 of type-1 moves is O(m). Moreover, we have the following observation. (
ii) If the leading set of the stable cut produced is smaller than that of the given cut, then the number of type-2 moves is smaller than that of type-1 moves.
As a byproduct of (M1) and (M2), one can easily deduce that the rebel game on a network, where each rebel switches between two choices in favor of the minority choice of her neighbors, is a potential game and thus possesses a Nash equilibrium. The potential function is defined as the size of the cut between the rebels holding different choices.
The following data structure is employed for efficiently identifying violations as well as verifying the stability of the cut. 
Lemma 3.2. In O(n) time, either the current cut is verified to be stable, or a move is found and conducted.
The following procedure, as a subroutine of our algorithm, finds a stable cut whose leading set contains at least half nodes of G. Step 2 that each (implementation) of the while-loop at Step 3 starts with a cut whose leading set has at least n/2 nodes. If this while-loop ends with a smaller leading set, by Lemma 3.1(ii) it must be the case that the while-loop conducts type-1 moves more times than conducting type-2 moves. Therefore after O(m ′ 1 ) moves, the procedure either terminates, or implements a while-loop that ends with a leading set S 1 not smaller than one at the beginning of the while-loop. In the latter case, the until-condition at Step 4 is satisfied, and the procedure terminates. The number of moves conducted by the last while-loop is O(m ′ 1 + n) as implied by Lemma 3.1(i).
Y-preferred schedules
When Y is more profitable, the basic idea behind our algorithms for finding regret-proof schedules goes as follows: Given a stable cut [S 1 , S 2 ], we try to schedule nodes in S 1 with Y and nodes in S 2 with N whenever possible. If not all nodes can be scheduled this way, we obtain another stable cut of larger size, from which we repeat the process. In the following pseudo-code description, scheduling an unscheduled node changes the node to be scheduled. 
is not stable.) Thus the condition in Step 7 is equivalent to saying "until all nodes of G are scheduled". Proof. Consider
Step 6 setting S
, of size at least t, which is larger than the old one. It follows that the repeat-loop can only repeat a number k (≤ m) of times. By Lemma 3.3, for i = 1, 2, . . . , k, we assume that Procedure 1 in the i-th repetition (of Steps 3-6) returns in O(t i n + n 2 ) time a cut whose size is t i larger than the size of its input. Then
The overall running time follows from the fact that O(n 2 ) time is enough for finishing a whole while-loop at Step 5. Note from Lemma 3. 3 that the final cut [S 1 , S 2 ] produced by Procedure 1 is stable and satisfies |S 1 | ≥ n/2. Since [S 1 , S 2 ] is the cut associated with the final schedule output, the theorem is proved.
Similar to Remark 2.3, the output of Algorithm 3 specifies a regret-proof schedule for marketing one product such that at least a half of consumers buy the product.
N -preferred schedules
The goal of this subsection is to design an algorithm for finding a regret-proof schedule with as many N decisions as possible. In the following Algorithm 4, we work on a dynamically changing cut [S 1 , S 2 ] of G whose size keeps nondecreasing. Our algorithm consists of 2-layer nested repeat-loops.
• Inner loop: From any [S 1 , S 2 ], by moving violating nodes, we make it stable. Then we try to schedule nodes in S 1 with Y and nodes in S 2 with N whenever possible. If not all nodes can be scheduled, we reset [S 1 , S 2 ] to be a larger cut, and repeat; otherwise we obtain a schedule with associated cut [S 1 , S 2 ].
• Outer loop: After obtaining a schedule, we swap S 1 and S 2 , and repeat.
• Termination: We stop when we obtain (consecutively) two schedules whose associated cuts have equal size.
• Output: Among the obtained schedules, we output the best one with a maximum number of N decisions
In the following pseudo-code, we use r and s to denote the sizes of cuts associated with the two schedules we find consecutively. We use K to denote the largest number of N decisions we currently achieve by some schedule.
Algorithm 4. Input: Network G. Output: A regret-proof schedule for G.
// swap S1 and S2
Set all nodes of G to be unscheduled 7.
While ∃ unscheduled v ∈ S i (i ∈ {1, 2}) whose decision is D i do schedule v 8.
T i ← {scheduled nodes with decision
//reset [S1, S2] to be a larger cut Proof. An implementation of the inner repeat-loop executes Steps 5-9 at most m times. From the termination condition at
Step 13, we see that the outer repeat-loop runs O(m) times. Furthermore, we may assume that the algorithm implements Steps 5-9 for a number of ℓ times, where the i-th implementation of Step 5 (resp.
Step 9) increases the cut size by m i (resp. n i ), i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ, such that m i + n i ≥ 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ − 1 and m ℓ + n ℓ = 0. Since Performance. Let r * ≥ 1 denote the final common value of r and s in Algorithm 4. It is easy to see that the algorithm implements Step 5 at least twice (as otherwise, r * = 0). Let W ℓ−1 (resp. W ℓ ) denote the second-last (resp. last) implementation of (the while-loop at) Step 5. Since W ℓ does not increase the cut size, any violating node v satisfies d S1 (v) = d S2 (v) at the time it is moved. Therefore, recalling (3.1), the moves conducted by W ℓ (if any) are type-2 ones, which move nodes from S 2 to S 1 . Let T (⊆ K 1 ) denote the set of all these nodes moved. It is clear that V is the disjoint union of K 2 , L 2 and T such that
After W ℓ , the algorithm schedules all nodes of L 1 with Y and all nodes of L 2 with N , finishing the last run of the inner repeat-loop.
Claim 7. If T = ∅, then T is an independent set of graph G, and
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that two nodes x, y ∈ T are adjacent, and the while-loop W ℓ moves x earlier than moving y (from S 2 to S 1 ). By (3.2) , at the beginning of
holds for all v ∈ S 2 at any time of this while-loop. At the time W ℓ considers y, node x has been moved to S 1 and d S2 (y) = d S1 (y). The adjacency of x and y implies that d S2 (y) > d S1 (y) and y ∈ S 2 hold before x is removed from S 2 , which is a contradiction. So T is an independent set. It follows that throughout the while-loop,
follows from the fact that G is connected, and T is independent. Proof. Note that the schedule output by the algorithm has its associated cut stable. Thus the algorithm does output a regret-proof schedule. Suppose the output schedule ensures a number of k decisions of N . Since the algorithm has scheduled all nodes of K 2 (resp. L 2 ) with N , Step 11 guarantees that
as V is the disjoint union of K 2 , L 2 , T , and T is either empty or an independent set of G. It remains to prove k ≥ λ := √ n + 1 − 1. Suppose on the contrary that k < λ, saying |K 2 | < λ and
Notice from Claim 7 that each node of T is adjacent to at least one node of L 2 , implying [L 2 , T ] ≥ |T | > n − 2λ. By (3.2) and (3.3), the stability of [
Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied, from an algorithmic point of view, the marketing schedule problem for promoting products with negative externalities, aiming at profit maximization (from the seller's perspective) and regret-free decisions (from the consumers' perspective). We have shown that the problem of finding a schedule with maximum profit is NP-hard and admits constant approximation. We find in strongly polynomial time schedules that lead to regret-free decisions. These regret-proof schedules have satisfactory performance in terms of profit maximization, while it is left open whether both regret-proof-ness and constant profit approximation can be guaranteed in case of product N being more profitable. Our model and results apply to marketing one or two (types of) products with negative externalities in undirected social networks. An interesting question is what happens when marketing three or more (types of) products and/or the network is directed.
APPENDIX A Proof of Theorem 2.4
We prove the NP-hardness of maximizing the number of N decisions by reduction from the 3-OCC-MAX-2SAT problem. It is a restriction of the MAX-2SAT problem, which, given a collection of disjunctive clauses of literals, each clause having at most two literals, and each literal occurring in at most three clauses, is to find a truth assignment to satisfy as many clauses as possible. It is known that 3-OCC-MAX-2SAT is NP-hard [12] .
Construction. Consider any instance I of the 3-OCC-MAX-2SAT problem: N boolean variables x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x N and M clauses y j = (x j1 ∨ x j2 ), j = 1, 2, . . . , M , where
We construct an instance G = (V, E) of the rebel scheduling problem in polynomial time as follows.
• Create a pair of literal nodes x i and ¬x i representing, respectively, variable x i and its negation, i = 1, 2, . . . , N ;
• Create a clause node y j representing clause y j , j = 1, 2, . . . , M ;
• Link literal node x with clause node y iff literal x occurs in clause y;
• Create a gadget G i for each pair of literal nodes x i and ¬x i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N (see Fig. 1 ) as follows:
-add four groups of nodes, Clearly, |V | = 2N + M + N (13 + 9L) = M + (15 + 9L)N . Clause nodes are not contained in any gadget. Each literal node is contained in a unique gadget G i ; it has exactly 13 neighbors in G i , and at most 3 neighbors outside G i , which correspond to the clauses containing it. Each node in A i has exactly two neighbors x i and ¬x i . Each C i induces a cycle. All nodes in D i are pendant.
Let opt(I) denote the optimal value for the 3-OCC-MAX-2SAT instance I. Let opt(G) denote the maximum number of N decisions contained in the outcome of a schedule for G. We will prove in Lemmas A.1 and A.2 that opt(G) = opt(I) + (5 + 9L)N , which establishes Theorem 2.4. Under the optimality, we will show that the literal nodes with Y decisions in an optimal schedule correspond to TRUE literals in an optimal truth assignment. The gadget G i is used to guarantee that exactly one of x i and ¬x i chooses Y.
Schedule. We construct a schedule π for G under which opt(I) clause nodes, N literal nodes and all Proof. Let T be the set of TRUE literals in an optimal truth assignment of I. Then T is an independent set of literal nodes in G such that for each i = 1, 2, . . . , N , exactly one of x i and ¬x i is contained in T . The schedule π proceeds in two stages.
In the first stage, π schedules the (literal) nodes in T and then the M clause nodes. Since T is independent, all its nodes choose Y. Therefore, the opt(I) clause nodes (which correspond to the satisfied clauses) all choose N . In the second stage, π schedules gadgets one after another in an arbitrary order. For each gadget G i , let x be x i or ¬x i whichever belongs to T and thus has chosen Y. Within subnetwork G i , schedule π proceeds in five steps. (1) π schedules the nodes in the independent set A i ∪ B i first; obviously these nodes all choose N due to their common neighbor x. (2) Then π schedules c Proof. Suppose that π * schedules some literal node x ∈ {x i , ¬x i } with decision Y for some i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }. Note that x has at most 16 neighbors; 9 of them belong to C i and are scheduled by π * with decisions Y (see Claim 8) . It must be the case that π * schedules x before the last scheduled node c ∈ C i . At the time π Proof. By Claim 9, {1, 2, . . . , N } is the disjoint union of two sets K 1 and K 2 such that π * schedules exactly one of x i and ¬x i with N for every i ∈ K 1 , and schedules x i and ¬x i with N for every i ∈ K 2 . Note that |K 1 | = |T * |, |T * | + |K 2 | = N and π * schedules all nodes in {a 
B Time complexity in Theorem 2.5
Preprocessing. Initially, we set graph H to be G = (V, E), We find in O(m) time a maximal independent set X of H, and set Y := V \ X.
To find X i , Y i , i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , ℓ, we will modify H step by step via removing some nodes (together with their incident links). At any step, we call a node of H an X-node (resp. a Y node) if this node belongs to X (resp. Y ). In H, a Y -node is critical if it is adjacent to a pendant X-node. Any single non-critical node can be removed from H without destroying the Y -node domination of X-nodes.
Inductively, we consider i = 0, 1, . . . , ℓ in this order. The i-th stage of the process starts with H = G i and Y i = ∅. Subsequently, (i) whenever H has a non-critical Y -node v, we remove v from H, add v to Y i , and update H.
The repetition finishes when all Y -nodes in H are critical. At that time, the i-th stage finishes with (ii) outputting Y i and X i+1 the set of pendant nodes;
(iii) removing all nodes of X i+1 from H, and updates H which gives G i+1 = H.
Running time. Next we show that all the above ℓ + 1 stages finish in O(m) time. At the initiation step, in O(m) time we find the set of pendant X-nodes, and the set of non-critical Y -nodes of H, where H = G.
As our preprocessing proceeds, when we remove a Y -node v from H, we update H by modifying the adjacency list representation of H, and
• updating the degrees of all X-nodes;
• updating the set of pendant X-nodes (using the degrees updated);
• updating the set of non-critical Y -nodes (using the pendant X-nodes created).
